Recent work on children's inferences concerning biological and chemical categories has suggested that children (and perhaps adults) are essentialists ± a view known as psychological essentialism. I distinguish three varieties of psychological essentialism and investigate the ways in which essentialism explains the inferences for which it is supposed to account. Essentialism succeeds in explaining the inferences, I argue, because it attributes to the child belief in causal laws connecting category membership and the possession of certain characteristic appearances and behavior. This suggests that the data will be equally well explained by a non-essentialist hypothesis that attributes belief in the appropriate causal laws to the child, but makes no claim as to whether or not the child represents essences. I provide several reasons to think that this non-essentialist hypothesis is in fact superior to any version of the essentialist hypothesis. q
Introduction
Our theories shape the way we conceive of the world. Recent psychological work on concepts and conceptual development has suggested that several of these theories are, in some sense, essentialist, at least in their naive (pre-scienti®c) forms. This view is called the hypothesis of psychological essentialism or simply the essentialist hypothesis. The aims of this paper are (1) to distinguish several different varieties of psychological essentialism, (2) to argue that one of these is superior to the rest, and (3) to E-mail address: strevens@csli.standord.edu (M. Strevens) 1 Throughout this paper, an`essentialist' hypothesis is, of course, a hypothesis that attributes essentialism to children (and perhaps some adults), not a hypothesis that is itself committed to essentialism.
